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Comment

The Pursuit of Happiness (and Sexual
Freedom): Lawrence v. Texas,
Morality Legislation & the
Sandy Springs Obscenity Statute

I.

INTRODUCTION

In their private lives, individuals engage in a variety of activities.

Historically, particular activities have been labeled as immoral,
including interracial marriages, the ability to have an abortion, and
same-sex relationships.' Also included in this list is the sale of "sexual

1. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (prior to the Court's decision in
Loving, many states prohibited marriage between blacks and whites, because interracial
relations were considered improper. The landmark decision invalidated anti-miscegenation
laws throughout the country, which during the time, were in place in seventeen states.);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (a seminal case in American jurisprudence, where the
Supreme Court held that women possess the right to decide whether to have an abortion.
Abortion has been a heavily debated topic in the United States, with proponents arguing
that women have the right to choose and their opponents arguing that the right lacks
constitutional foundation.); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (although the
landmark decision did not explicitly declare bans on same-sex marriages as unconstitutional, the Court held that restricting U.S. federal interpretation of the term "marriage" to
apply to only heterosexual marriages was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.).
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devices," which have routinely been defined as material used primarily
for the stimulation of human genital organs.2 Such definitions have
been utilized in both state statutes and city-wide ordinances throughout
the country, where laws have been enacted to prohibit the sale, lease,
trade, and, in some cases, possession of sexual devices.3
Unsurprisingly, a number of individuals and vendors who engage in
activities distributing and using sexual devices in certain states and
municipalities have challenged such prohibitions, claiming that the
prohibitions violate their constitutional rights.' As challenges against
such laws differ on a case-by-case basis, state and federal court decisions
vary widely in determining whether to uphold the laws in question, and,
currently, there is a split between the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits on the constitutionality of such
prohibitions.' The leading cause of this split, as well as the ensuing
confusion, is the United States Supreme Court's 2003 decision in
Lawrence v. Texas,6 where the Court struck down a Texas statute that
prohibited certain homosexual acts.7 The Lawrence decision has been
applied to both state-wide and city-wide obscenity laws throughout the

2. In many statutes, both state- and city-wide, sexual devices are defined as "obscene"
material. The term "obscene" has a very specific meaning within jurisprudence and will
be used minimally in this Comment. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 39 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (establishing a 3-prong test for defining obscene material:
determining "(a) whether the 'average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,...
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The Author questions whether
sexual devices fall within the parameters of the test.
3. As of October 21, 2014, Alabama is the only state that has an all-out ban on the sale
of sex toys. See These States still Ban Cohabitation,Sex Toys... And Gay Marriage,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 6, 2014), http//www.huffgtonpost.com/2014/03/06/gay-marriagebans-_n_4907115.html. However, several counties and cities within states also prohibit the
sale of sex toys.
4. See Complaint, Flanigan's Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, GA, 13-cv-3573
(filed Oct. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Complaint]; Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316 (2007)
(Williams II).
5. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008); Williams v. AG
of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (Williams I); see also PHE, Inc. v. State, 877
So. 2d 1244 (Miss. 2004) (case brought before the Supreme Court of Mississippi by vendors
and users of sexual devices challenging a local statute. The supreme court found in favor
of the ordinance, holding that the prohibition was in valid furtherance of the government's
interests); Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (court found in favor of
the state, holding that it had the right to prohibit the sale of sexual devices).
6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
7. Id. at 578-79.
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country.' As a result, both state and federal courts' attempts to apply
Lawrence have been strenuous and vary widely.
While some courts and commentators argue that Lawrence created a
fundamental right to privacy should be applicable to obscenity statutes,
others argue that the decision in Lawrence should not be applied to such
matters because the decision did not create a fundamental right to
privacy, let alone a fundamental right to sexual privacy. For example,
some courts, like the Fifth Circuit in Reliable Consultants, Inc. v.
Earle,9 have interpreted the decision in Lawrence to have created a
right to privacy, including private sexual activity." On the other hand,
other courts, like the Eleventh Circuit in Williams v. AG of Alabama
(Williams )," contend that the scope of Lawrence is limited and that
the Court was very careful and methodical in the language it used in its
opinion, purportedly supporting the notion that the High Court did not
intend to create a new fundamental right. 2 These differing decisions
have caused confusion regarding whether obscenity statutes should be
deemed valid or invalid.
When the state of Alabama enacted a law that prohibited the sale,
transfer, and lease of sexual devices, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the
statute as constitutional. 3 Despite this ruling, a case has been filed in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
challenging the constitutionality of a Sandy Springs, Georgia obscenity
statute (Ordinance), brought by several companies and joined by two
After reviewing the matter on the
Georgia citizens (Plaintiffs). 4
merits, the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
The
judgment, bound by the Eleventh Circuit's prior decision.15
Plaintiffs have appealed the district court's decision, and the matter is
currently pending before the Eleventh Circuit, and it wil be interesting
to see whether the court will affirm its previous findings or take

8. See, e.g., Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d 738; Williams 1, 378 F.3d 1232;
Complaint, supra note 4.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 747.
378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1250.
See Complaint, supra note 4; see also Intervenor Complaint, Flanigan's Enterprises,

Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, GA, No. 13-CV-03473-RLV (N.D. Ga. Apr. 16, 2014)
[hereinafter Intervenor Complaint]. Intervenor Complaint was dismissed and consolidated

with the Complaint.
15. See Flanigan's Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, No. 1:13-CV-03573-HLM,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180429, at *45 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 20, 2014).
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to overrule its previous decision and follow
advantage of the opportunity
6
suit with the Fifth Circuit.1
Part IA of this comment will begin with a recitation of the historical
use of sexual devices and their treatment by governments. Part IB will
first lay out the Ordinance and the consequences that potential violators
of the law face. A related ordinance supporting the enactment of
legislation controlling the zoning and operation of adult establishments
provides some insight into the city's purpose in enacting its obscenity
statute. The findings provision appears to contemplate challenges as it
cites cases relating to the city's "substantial government interest in
preventing the negative secondary effects of establishments" that sell
such material. 7 Part IB will go on to discuss the suit that was filed,
as well as the district court's subsequent decision to uphold the current
law.
Part HA will briefly provide background of the rights that have
commonly been raised in obscenity statute cases throughout the country.
Part IB will discuss the Supreme Court case of Lawrence v. Texas which
has resulted in the split between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and
the Court's reasoning behind its holding.
Lawrence has created an interpretation conundrum, which has led to
the split between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits (not to mention many
different interpretations within and among the states). Part IIIA will
discuss the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of this daunting case, while
Part IIB will discuss the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation. Part IIIC
will go through interpretations and suggestions posed by scholars in the
field, evidencing that it is not only the courts that have found this a
difficult issue to deal with.
Part IV will analyze the Ordinance under the framework commonly
believed to have come out of Lawrence and contrast that with the
framework the district court based its holding on. Part VB will discuss
whether morals should be considered during the legislative process and
whether they have a place in the legislature. The section will close out
with a brief discussion of the harsh punishments often found in moralsbased laws. A brief conclusion will follow.

16. Flanigan's Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, GA, No. 1: 13-CV-03573-HLM,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180429, appeal docketed, No. 14-15499 (11th Cir. Jan. 21, 2015).
17. Sandy Springs, Ga. Ordinance No. 2009-04-24, codified at SANDY SPRINGS, GA.
CODE § 38-120. Although not found in the Sandy Springs Code, Ordinance No. 2009-04-24
can be found by conducting a search through a search engine.
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THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF SEXUAL DEVICES &
THE SANDY SPRINGS ORDINANCE

A.

The Origins of Sexual Devices

The origins of the use of sexual devices in the United States began
with medical treatment, where vibrators were often used by physicians
to treat hysteria in their patients (who, historically, were women)."8
Eventually, the exclusive use of vibrators at the doctor's office grew to
include use in the homes of the patients. 9 By being able to purchase
vibrators on their own, patients were able to self-treat at a lower cost as
well as maintain their privacy.2" In the early twentieth century,
vibrators began to be advertised in magazines and were often advertised
as "massagers. '
Vibrators in the United States are still utilized for medical purposes,
so much so that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recognizes and
categorizes certain vibrators as a Class III device. 2 Class III devices
are "those that support or sustain human life, are of substantial
importance in preventing impairment of human health, or which present
a potential, unreasonable risk of illness or injury."23 This classification
of vibrators evidences an acknowledgment of the commonality and

18. RACHEL P. MAINES, THE TECHNOLOGY OF ORGASM: "HYSTERIA," THE VIBRATOR, AND
WOMEN'S SEXUAL SATISFACTION 2 (1999). Prior to the late twentieth century, hysteria was
viewed to be a mental condition suffered only by women. The vibrator was invented as a
replacement for doctors and nurses, who traditionally used their hands to perform
treatment for hysteria. At the time, such touching was strictly viewed as medical, and
there was no sexual connotation associated with it. Id. at 3.
19. See Michael Castleman, "Hysteria"and the StrangeHistory of Vibrators,PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Mar. 1, 2013), httpJ/www.psychologytoday.com/blog/all-about-sex/201303/hysteriaand-the-strange-history-vibrators.
20. See id.
21. Id.; see also Richard Glover, Can't Buy a Thrill:? Substantive Due Process, Equal
Protection,and CriminalizingSex Toys, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 555, 560 (2010).
22. 21 C.F.R. § 884.5940 (2010); see Julie McKenna, Substantive Due Process/Privacy
- Stay Calm, Don't Get Hysterical: A User's Guide to Arguing the Unconstitutionalityof
Anti-Vibrator Statutes, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 211,217-18 (2011); see also Alans Chazan,
Good Vibrations:Liberating Sexuality from the Commercial Regulation of Sexual Devices,
18 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 263, 293 (2009) (stating that the FDA's definition has been used
by the Eleventh Circuit to assert that the medical exemption found in many obscenity
statutes are sufficient to sustain their availability for medical purposes).
23. See McKenna, supra note 22, at 217 (quoting U.S. Food and Drug Admin.,
Premarket Approval (PMA), FDA, http'/www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulation
andGuidancelHowtoMarketYourDevice/premarketsubmissions/premarketapprovalpma/De
fault.thm (last updated June 19, 2014).
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necessity of sexual devices in certain circumstances. 24 Despite this
classification, many jurisdictions have opted to ban the use and sale of
such devices, usually based upon moral feelings. But, on the other hand,
the FDA's medical classification has also been used to serve as a
justification of the morals-based laws banning the sale of them. For
example, many obscenity statutes include a provision allowing an
exemption for the sale of sexual devices if they serve a medical need.25
Although vibrators historically have a medical background, the
accessibility and popularity of sexual devices has grown exponentially
since their arrival in the commercial market. It is reported that
approximately 52.5% of women have used a vibrator in their past.2"
Furthermore, the market, although predominately directed towards
women, has grown to include men as well. The acceptability of the use
of sexual devices continues to grow as both men and women turn to such
devices to enhance their intimate lives.
B.

Sandy Springs, Georgia and Its Prohibition

1. The Statute. Sandy Springs Municipal Code Section 38-12027
(the Ordinance) prohibits the sale, rental, or lease of specifically defined
obscene material. The Ordinance states:
(a) A person commits the offense of distributing obscene material when
the following occurs:
(1) He sells, rents, or leases to any person any obscene material of
any description, knowing the obscene nature thereof, or offers to do
so, or possesses such material with the intent to do so...
(b) Material is obscene if:
(1) To the average person applying contemporary community
standards, taken as a whole, it predominantly appeals to the
prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex, or excretion.
(2) The material, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value...

24. See id.
25. See, e.g., SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 38-120(d); ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.4 (Supp.
2003).
26. Debra Herbenick et al., Prevalence and Charactaristicsof Vibrator Use by Women
in the United States:Results from a NationallyRepresentativeStudy, 6 J. SEX. MED, 1857,
1860 (2009).
27. SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE

§ 38-120.
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(c) Any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the
stimulation of human genital organs is obscene material under this
section. ... '
The ordinance does include exclusions and an affirmative defense,
excluding from its definition of obscene devices those that are primarily
intended to prevent pregnancy or the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases.' Accordingly, certain vendors are still able to stock and sell
different types of contraceptives, and consumers are still able to
purchase them. Additionally, under certain circumstances, if prescribed
by a medical physician, an individual may obtain a specific sexual device
from the physician.3 ° Although the transfer of devices that are defined
by the ordinance as obscene is prohibited, if the device was prescribed
by a medical physician "for a bona fide medical, scientific, educational,
legislative, judicial, or law enforcement purpose," alleged violators may
31
assert an affirmative defense.
Those who are found to have violated the Ordinance face the
32
Section 38-120(e)
possibility of serving jail time, among other things.
of the code states that a person who commits one of the listed offenses
33
contained therein will be found guilty of violating the code. Although
that specific section of the Ordinance does not state what a violation of
the code entails, Sandy Springs Municipal Code § 1-1034 sets the
35
Those convicted
penalties to be imposed for violating the entire code.
for violating the code will be "punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000.00, imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, confinement at
labor for a period of time not to exceed 30 days, or any combination
thereof."36 Violations of the obscenity statute are included within the
enforcement of this statute; thus, violators of the obscenity statute will
37
be subject to the punishments therein listed.

28. SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 38-120(aX1), (b)(1-2), (c). The ordinance also defines
obscene material as depicting acts of masturbation, material indicating sadomasochism,
and "lewd exhibition of the genitals." SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 38-120(bX3).
29. SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 38-120(c).
30. SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 38-120(d).
31. Id.
32. SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 1-10(c); see also Emily Shire, The Town Where Your Sex
Toy Could Land You in Jail,DAILY BEAST (May 30, 2014), available at http://www.thedai
lybeast.com/articles/201405/30/the-town-where-your-sex-toy-could-land-you-in-jail.html.
33. SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 38-120(e).
34.

SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 1-10.

35. Id.
36. SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 1-10(c).
37. See id.
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2. Challenging the Sandy Springs Statute. In 2013, several
business establishments with locations within Sandy Springs city limits
filed suit against the city (the Complaint) in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia.3" All of the establishments
have existed and operated as adult entertainment facilities since before
1997.39 The Complaint sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,40 alleging the Ordinance violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment4 1
rights. 42 The Complaint further alleged that the city council failed to
provide evidence of how its restrictions furthered a legitimate governmental interest or evidence of secondary effects that have resulted from
the presence of adult-oriented establishments. 3 Under their Due
Process argument, the Plaintiffs allege that through the Ordinance, the
city deprived them of their "property rights and liberty interests,"
because the Ordinance, "is vague as... to the [establishment that sold
sexual devices] because it is unclear whose intent matters regarding the
purpose or intended use of the device" and that the affirmative defense
section of the Ordinance was also vague." The Complaint went on to
allege the Ordinance violated the Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights
because they engage in activities that are thereunder protected.45
Two Georgia residents joined the lawsuit filed against the city by filing
an intervenor suit also challenging the validity and constitutionality of
the Ordinance (Intervenor Complaint).46 The first intervenor plaintiff,
Melissa Davenport, is a woman stricken with the debilitating inflammatory disease multiple sclerosis, and she claimed that utilizing sexual
devices in her and her husband's intimate lives has assisted in restoring
their intimacy.47 Because the disease strikes the nervous system and
"can damage nerve pathways to the sexual organs," Davenport and her
Davenport, through her
husband began to use sexual devices.'
attorney, argued that the Ordinance violates her right to privacy under

38. Complaint, supra note 4, at 2-3. Plaintiffs include Flanigan's Enterprises, Inc.,
which operates a bar that "offerts] nude dance entertainment,"; Flashers, which offers
similar entertainment to Flanigan's; Inserection, which operates a retail store selling both
non-obscene material and what is held by the code as obscene material. Id.
39. Id. at 3.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
41. U.S. CONST. amend I; U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
42. Complaint, supra note 4, at 39, 44, 48.
43. Id. at 35, 37-38.
44. Id. at 40, 42-43.
45. Id. at 47-48.
46. See Intervenor Complaint, supra note 14, at 1,2.
47. Id. at 3-4.
48. Id.
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the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Davenport has not
been able to receive a medical prescription for use of the sexual devices,
and accordingly, she does not fall within the parameters of the Ordinance that would allow her to assert an affirmative defense. However,
even if Davenport had a prescription for sexual devices, she argued that
the affirmative defenses available to her are unsatisfactory and would
not provide an outright right to purchase the devices within city
limits-she would be limited to obtaining the devices from her attending
medical physician.49
The second intervenor plaintiff, Marshall Henry, sought to purchase
sexual devices for personal use in Sandy Springs but was unable to do
so. As an artist, Henry has used sexual devices in his art exhibitions
and intends to continue to do so in the future, specifically in Sandy
Springs. However, because of the Ordinance, Henry alleged that he is
prevented from displaying his art or even purchasing particular
materials for his displays. The interveor Complaint reiterates that even
if Davenport and Henry could obtain the sexual devices in an approved
manner, they would still be in violation of the Ordinance and would be
forced to claim an affirmative defense-in other words, they would still
be prohibited from selling the devices, displaying them for artistic
purposes, or even prohibited from purchasing them from non-physician
vendors within city limits."0
Collectively, the plaintiffs from both complaints alleged that the
ordinance violated their right to privacy under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Plaintiffs contend that the
ordinance does not serve a compelling state interest. Other arguments
raised by the Plaintiffs include infringement of First Amendment rights,
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
overbreadth, and vagueness.51 These particular arguments will not be
discussed because they are beyond the scope of this Comment.
The district court swiftly dismissed all claims brought by the
Plaintiffs.52 The court warned that "[clourts must exercise great
caution in labeling a right as fundamental .

..

."'

Accepting the

Eleventh Circuit's previous decisions in the Williams line of cases, the
court refused to acknowledge that the right to privacy included a general
right to sexual privacy.5' Because the court found that there was no

49. Id. at 3, 4, 8.

50. Id. at 4-6, 7.
51. Id. at 9, 11, 12; see also Complaint, supra note 4, at 42-43, 44, 47-48.
52. See generally Flanigan'sEnters., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180429.

53. Id. at *20.
54. Id. at *21-22.
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fundamental right at stake in the matter, the court upheld the
as constitutionally valid after conducting a rational-basis
Ordinance
55
review.

III.

SEXUAL

PRIVACY: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OR

NOT?

An issue with obscenity statutes and bans on sexual devices is that
courts have had trouble determining whether there is a fundamental
right to sexual privacy. The consequences resulting from the creation of
a new fundamental right are not taken lightly by the Supreme Court,
and such rights are established with serious caution. Lawrence created
a divide among courts and scholars alike on whether the Supreme Court
articulated a new fundamental right to sexual privacy.
A.

The FourteenthAmendment & Fundamental Rights

The 1997 case of Washington v. Glucksberg56 articulated the process
for determining whether a law should be upheld even though it violates
a fundamental right. Fundamental rights are rights so important that
they warrant protection against governmental infringement unless strict
scrutiny analysis is met. 57 The trouble, however, is that the majority
of rights that have been deemed fundamental by the Court are not
actually mentioned in the Constitution.5" If a right is determined to be
so important that it needs to be recognized as a fundamental one, the
Court will utilize strict-scrutiny analysis.59
Once the Court determines that a right is fundamental and it has
been infringed upon, the Court will look at the government's justification
for infringing upon that right.60 At that point, the government must
present a compelling interest to justify an infringement and prove that
its goals could not be achieved by less restrictive means. 6' A few
fundamental rights currently recognized are the right for family

55. Id. at *13.
56. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
57. See id. at 720-21 (fundamental rights are those "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.").
58. The Bill of Rights to the Constitution specifically lists rights that United States
citizens enjoy. The remainder of rights recognized by the Court, including the right to
interstate travel, right to privacy, and the freedom to marry, are not specifically mentioned
in the Constitution.
59. See generally Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
60. See id. at 721.
61. Id. Alternatively, if the right is deemed to not be fundamental, the government
simply must present a legitimate purpose in order for the law to be upheld (called rationalbasis scrutiny). See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 607 (1995).

2015l
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autonomy (the right to marry6 2 and the right to keep the family
together 3 ), reproductive autonomy, 64 and the right to travel.6 5
In Lawrence, the court did not apply strict-scrutiny analysis.66 In
fact, at a bare minimum, it appears that the Court applied rational-basis
review, and although the government's threshold for meeting the burden
is relatively low, the Court still determined that the statute in question
was unconstitutional. 67 Rational basis is the lowest level of scrutiny
used by courts and requires very little for a law to pass as constitutional.6 8 Different from strict and intermediate scrutiny, the individual
challenging the law has the burden of proof.69 In challenging the law,
the individual must prove either that the government has no legitimate
interest in the law or policy or that there is no reasonable, rational link
betweenthat interest and the challenged law.7 °
B.

Causing Trouble - Lawrence v. Texas

The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas has been
interpreted in conflicting ways, causing a circuit split on whether there
is a constitutional right to buy sexual devices. Some circuits have held
that Lawrence created a new fundamental right in sexual privacy, while
others have argued contrarily. In Lawrence, the Supreme Court stated:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions
into a dwelling or other private places. In our, tradition the State is
not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives
and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a
dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct.7
In its opinion, the Court overruled its previous decision in Bowers v.

Hardwick,72 where it had upheld a Georgia law that criminalized

62. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1, 2.
63. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
64. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965); Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
65. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
66. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
67. Id.
68. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 114, 152 n.4 (1938).
69. Mabey Bridge & Short, Inc. v. Schooch, 666 F.3d 862, 876 (3d Cir. 2012).
70. Williams v. Pryor (Williams IIl), 240 F.3d 944, 948-49 (11th Cir. 2001).
71. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added).
72. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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sodomy.v It held that the statutes in both Bowers and Lawrence were
attempts by the state to interfere with the personal relationships of
people, finding that "[tihe liberty protected by the Constitution allows"
individuals to make their own choices about their personal relationships."4 Instead, the Court accepted Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers,
which contended that a state's view of a particular practice as immoral
does not constitute adequate justification to uphold a law prohibiting
that practice. 5
The statute challenged in Lawrence-like the one in Bowers-criminalized homosexual sodomy.76 Responding to a weapons
disturbance call, the Harris County Police Department entered the
residence of one of the petitioners and witnessed the petitioner engaging
in a sexual act with another man. The two men were arrested, charged,
and convicted before a Justice of the Peace. The petitioners argued that
the criminal statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; however, those contentions were dismissed at
77

trial.

Upon certiorari, the Supreme Court instead chose to analyze the
matter as violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
deciding that if they held the Texas statute invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause, "some might question whether a prohibition would be
valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between
same-sex and different-sex participants."7 1 It held that "[elquality of
treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important
respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests," and
that individuals have the right to engage in sexual conduct without

73. Id. at 188-89; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice

O'Connor did not join in overruling Bowers. Justice O'Connor expressed her view that the
matter before the Court should have been resolved using the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. Id. Such a statute, she stated, could have been struck down
using the rational-basis test, because objectives that consist of a "'bare .. . desire to harm
a politically unpopular group,' are not legitimate state interests." Id. at 580 (quoting Dep't
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).

74. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67.
75. Id. at 578. The Court was sure to note that the Bowers Court, in its decision, made
the point that homosexual conduct had bean viewed as immoral for centuries. Id. at 571.
While the Lawrence court did not discount the public's morals and convictions regarding
homosexuality, it questioned whether "the majority [could] use the power of the State to
enforce [its] views on the whole society though operation of the criminal law." Id.
76. Id. at 562.
77. Id. at 562-63.
78. Id. at 564, 575.
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government intrusion.7" The Court felt that the ramifications of a
statute criminalizing "protected conduct" would remain if it were not
examined for substantial validity-even if it was not enforceable for equal
protection reasons. 0 According to the Court, statutes such as Texas'
invited discrimination against homosexuals both publicly and privately."1 The Court determined that the Due Process Clause gave the
plaintiffs-and other same-sex couples-the right to "engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government." 2
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court also established the type of governmental interests that were considered constitutionally insufficient to
sustain a law that infringes on a substantive due process right." For
example, morality based justifications were insufficient to serve as a
rational basis on a ban on sexual devices.'
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated that she would have
struck down the law on equal protection grounds, rather than due
process, because only homosexual sodomy was prohibited by the Texas
statute, whereas opposite-sex sodomy was not. 5 Justice O'Connor
argued that rational-basis review has been applied to hold laws that
inhibit personal relationships unconstitutional and opined that deciding
the case under equal protection would have been sufficiently effective,
and Bowers did not have to be overruled."
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. 7 Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, noted the majority's statement that the "emerging
awareness" regarding sexual activity was sufficient to meet the "deeply
rooted in [the] Nation's history and traditions" test for acknowledging a
fundamental right was false." Emerging awareness, he argued, is not
synonymous to "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and traditions."89
Regarding the majority's holding that there was no rational basis that
justified the enactment of the sodomy statute, Justice Scalia summarily
dismissed it.90 The statute, he said, was similar to criminal laws that

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 575, 578.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 577-78; see also Reliable Consultants,517 F.3d at 745.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78; see also Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 745.

85. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579,581 (O'Connor, J., concurring);Reliable Consultants,517

F.3d at 744.
86. 539 U.S. at 579, 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Id.at 586-606 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).

88. Id.at 598.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 599.
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prohibited bigamy, adultery, adult incest, and bestiality, and they were
all based on the public's belief that certain behavior was immoral.9 1 In
Justice Scalia's opinion, the majority's ruling "effectively decree[d] the
end of all morals legislation," and laws prohibiting the activities
aforementioned would survive rational-basis review.92
Justice Thomas, in his own dissent, stated that he would rather have
the legislature overturn the "uncommonly silly" statute. 93 Regardless,
Justice Thomas stated that it was his duty to decide cases in accordance
to the Constitution, and because he could not find any language in the
Bill of Rights or other part of the Constitution creating a general right
to privacy, he agreed that the right should not be recognized. 94
WHAT DOES LAWRENCE MEAN? COMMON ARGUMENTS AGAINST

IV.

OBSCENITY STATUTES AND THE LAWRENCE FRAMEWORK

The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted the ruling in
Lawrence in different ways. The Fifth Circuit, in Reliable Consultants,
Inc. v. Earle, ruled that a Texas obscenity statute that prohibited the
transfer (by sale, gift, or lending) of sexual devices unconstitutional.9"
To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit, in Williams I, ruled that a statute
prohibiting the commercial sale of sexual devices for pecuniary value
was constitutional.9 6 These interpretations are not exclusive, as many
scholars have tried to decode the meaning behind Lawrence as well.
Obscenity Statutes Are Unconstitutional- The Fifth Circuit

A.

Several states have decreed certain obscenity laws to be unconstitutional. Whether an obscenity statute is deemed unconstitutional appears
to turn on how the deciding court interprets the Supreme Court's ruling
in Lawrence. When researching courts that have ruled obscenity
statutes unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit is notorious. The Fifth
Circuit determined that a state-wide prohibition on the sale of sexual
devices was unconstitutional. 97 Additionally, other states' supreme
courts have also determined similar prohibitions to be unconstitutional,
including Louisiana, Kansas, and Colorado.98

91. Id.
92. Id.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 605-06.
Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 740, 747.
Williams 1, 378 F.3d at 1250.
Reliable Consultants,517 F.3d at 747.
Id. at 741 (it should be noted that these were each of the noted states' supreme

courts).
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Texas Penal Code Annotated §§ 43.2199 and 43.23'0° made it illegal
to sell, advertise, give, or lend devices used for sexual stimulation unless
the defendant had a legitimate, statutorily-approved purpose.'' The
statute did not, however, make it illegal to use or possess sexual
devices. 02 The suit that challenged the Texas statute and ultimately
led to its demise was Reliable Consultants,Inc., in which the plaintiff
retailers argued that their customers had the right, under the Fourteenth Amendment, "to engage in private intimate conduct in the home
The Fifth Circuit determined that
without government intrusion."'
the interests asserted by the Texas government for establishing the ban
did not meet the standards set forth for justifying the enactment by the
Supreme Court in Lawrence.'l°
The Lawrence Court, the Fifth Circuit argued, recognized that the
right individuals possessed under the Fourteenth Amendment "Was not
simply a right to engage in [] sexual" activity, but was actually "a right
to be free from governmental intrusion 'regarding the most private
human contact, sexual behavior."" 5 The Fifth Circuit determined
that because of the Lawrence ruling, the issue before it was whether the
Texas statute "impermissibly burden[ed] the individual's substantive due
process right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her
choosing."' ° Accordingly, if the Lawrence Court held public morality
as insufficient justification for a law that restricted consensual adult
intimacy, such0 7a justification could not serve as rational basis for the
Texas statute.
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court did not
explicitly create a new fundamental right, and instead held the right to
be implicit in the language used in the Lawrence decision.' 8 The Fifth
Circuit found that explicitly declaring a new fundamental right was
unnecessary because the Supreme Court stated that "individual

99. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21 (West 2013).
100. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.23 (West 2013).
101. Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 741.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 742-43.
104. Id. at 743.
105. Id. at 744. The court argued that the Supreme Court recognized this as a
constitutional right because it chose to answer the question presented in the affirmative
by stating "[wle granted certiorari... [to resolve whether] petitioners' criminal convictions
for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and
privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (quoting
Lawrence, 538 U.S. at 564 (alterations in original)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 745.
108. Id. at 744.
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decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical
relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of
'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by
unmarried as well as married persons." 0 9
Rebutting the State's argument, the Fifth Circuit also determined that
the sale of sexual devices was not synonymous with the sale of sex." 0
The court decided to focus on the burden placed on "the individual's
right to make private decisions about consensual intimate conduct."'
The Fifth Circuit was very clear; it stated that the matter was about the
state attempting to control what people do in the privacy of their own
homes based on the State's moral opposition to a particular type of
sexual behavior." 2 Issuing a final blow, the Fifth Circuit determined
that the State's purpose in enacting the statute was morality-based." 3
Interpreting the language used in Lawrence regarding morality-based
laws broadly, the Fifth Circuit struck down the state statute."4 The
State argued that it had a more compelling state interest, which was to
protect minors and disinterested adults from unwanted exposure to
The Fifth Circuit dismissed this argument and
sexual devices."'
struck down the law, finding 6that the justification was too generalized
for such a harsh restriction."
B.

The Complete Opposite- The Eleventh Circuit

Contrary to the Firth Circuit's determination that Lawrence established a fundamental right,"7 the Eleventh Circuit argued that
Lawrence did not create such a right."" In Williams I, the court held
that there was no fundamental right for sexual privacy." 9 In direct
contrast to the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit held that statutes
prohibiting the sale of sexual devices are constitutional under the due

109.
110.

Id. at 744-45 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
Id. at 746. The court noted that "there are justifications for criminalizing

prostitution other than public morality, including promoting public safety and preventing
injury and coercion." Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 745.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 746.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 744.
118. Williams I, 378 F.3d at 1233, 1235.
119. Id. at 1235.
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The
process clause of the Washington v. Glucksberg analysis. 2
statute at issue in Williams I was Ala. Code § 13A-12-200.2,12 1 which
prohibited the commercial distribution of "any device designed or
marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital
organs for any thing of pecuniary value." 22 According to the Eleventh
Circuit, the statute's breadth was narrow; it only prohibited the sale of
sexual devices and did not criminalize the "use, possession, or gratuitous
distribution" of sexual devices. 123 Residents of Alabama could, if they
chose, purchase sexual devices outside of the state and bring them back
for use, and furthermore, the statute exempted the sale of sexual devices
used for "bona fide medical, scientific, educational, legislative, judicial,
or law enforcement purpose. '""24
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 25 The plaintiffs in Williams H focused on the Due
Process Clause's substantive component, which provides a "heightened
protection against government interference with certain fundamental
rights and liberty interests."2 " In particular, the plaintiffs argued
that the use of sexual devices was among the activities protected under
substantive due process, even though it was not explicitly listed in the
Constitution. 2 The plaintiffs argued that through the prohibition,
Alabama acted "'in violation of the fundamental rights of privacy and
personal autonomy that protect an individual's lawful sexual practices
,,,128

The court applied the standard established in Washington v. Glucksberg because the ACLU wished it to recognize a new fundamental
right.129 In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court set a standard for analyzing whether a new fundamental right should be recognized. 3 ' First,
the court begins with a "careful description of the asserted right."' 3 '
Next, the court must determine if that carefully described right is one
of those fundamental rights and liberties that are deeply rooted in the

120. Id. at 1233, 1235.
121. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (Supp. 2003).
122. Id.
123. Williams I, 378 F.3d at 1233.
124. Id. (quoting ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.4).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
126. Williams 1, 378 F.3d at 1235 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)).
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2002)).
129. Id.
130. Washington, 521 U.S. at 720-21; Williams 1, 378 F.3d at 1235.
131. Williams 1, 378 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
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Nation's history and tradition "and 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty', such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed."' 13 2 Applying this test to Alabama's statute, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the district court erred and it should have looked to
whether there was a history and tradition of protection of the right.'33
According to the Eleventh Circuit, strong evidence that the Supreme
Court did not recognize a new fundamental right in Lawrence was that
the High Court did not use the Glucksberg analysis in its ruling, which
is typically the analysis used in creating a new fundamental right.'
The court refused to assume that the Supreme Court implicitly overruled
Glucksberg, and noted that the precedential case was never mentioned
in the Lawrence opinion.' 35
Interpreting the holding in Lawrence, the Eleventh Circuit held that
any interpretation of the Supreme Court case that stated a new
fundamental right was recognized was "strained and ultimately
incorrect." 13 6 The court refused to interpret the Lawrence Court's
ruling and what it considered dicta as creating right to sexual privacy. 3 ' It held that such an interpretation would place a fundamentalrights interpretation "on a decision that rested on rational-basis grounds,
that never engaged in Glucksberganalysis, and that never invoked strict
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit determined that it
scrutiny." 3 '
would be incorrect to "impose a fundamental rights interpretation on a
decision that rested on rational-basis grounds . . . that never invoked

strict scrutiny."39
The Eleventh Circuit refused to accept the plaintiffs' assertion that a
fundamental right was violated by the enactment of the statute.140

It

determined that fundamental rights were not considered fundamental
"simply because they implicate deeply personal and private considerations," but instead because they had deep roots in the nation's history
and tradition, and because of such, "neither liberty nor justice would
The court determined that the Suexist if they were sacrificed."'

132. Washington, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
133. Williams 11, 378 F.3d at 1242.
134. Id. at 1237.

135. Id.
136. Id. at 1236 (quoting Lofton v. Sec. of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d
804, 817 (2004)).
137. Id. at 1238.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1237.
140. Id. at 1233.
141. Id. at 1235 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
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repeatedly refused to recognize a fundamental right in
preme Court has
142
sexual privacy.
Interestingly, the court held that restrictions on the ability to purchase
3
an item are "tantamount to restrictions on the use of that item.""
Because of this, the court acknowledged that it must determine whether
the Constitution not only protected the right to sell sexual devices, but
also protected the right to use them.1 " The court held in favor of the
statute and found that it was a constitutionally valid exercise of state

power.145
In Williams v. Morgan (Williams II),146 the Eleventh Circuit, again
finding in favor of an obscenity statute, differentiated between the
sexual device prohibition that was at issue and the statute that was at
issue in Lawrence.14' In particular, the Alabama statute in question
This was
in Williams H prohibited public, commercial activity.
distinguishable from the statute at issue in Lawrence because the
sodomy statute prohibited private and non-commercial activity. 148 The
Eleventh Circuit held that a state has the right to regulate commercial
activity if it finds such activity harmful to the public. 14 9 Similar to the
Ordinance, the statute did not prohibit the "use, possession, or gratuThe court determined that the
itous distribution of sexual devices."'
statute did not target private conduct, per se, but rather it targeted
commercial activity, and accordingly, the government's interest or
purpose in maintaining public morality is sufficient under rational-basis
scrutiny.'5 ' The Eleventh Circuit further held that Lawrence did not
render public morality as an invalid purpose under rational basis and
argued that the Supreme Court continues to uphold laws based on public
morality."2

142. Id. at 1235.
143. Id. at 1242. The court compared such matters to the one present in Glucksberg,
where, it stated, the ban on providing suicide assistance thereby burdened the right to
receive suicide assistance. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1250.
146. 478 F.3d 1316 (2007). The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Williams v. Morgan is the
third separate opinion for the matter, which initially began with Williams v. Pryor
(Williams III) in 2001. 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001). In issuing all three opinions, the
Eleventh Circuit has consistently upheld the Alabama obscenity statute as constitutional.
See id; Williams 1, 378 F.3d at 1232, 1250; Williams II, 478 F.3d at 1316, 1318.
147. Williams I, 478 F.3d at 1322-23.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1322.
150. Id. at 1318.
151. Id. at 1322-23.
152. Id. at 1323.
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The Eleventh Circuit is not alone in finding that the language used in
Lawrence does not extend to a right of intimacy, or creates a right of
intimacy. In Burr v. Biden, 53 the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware explained that the Lawrence Court did not create
a general right to privacy, nor did it state that the right to privacy is a
fundamental one."s The court went on to explain the fact that the
Supreme Court only addressed the term "fundamental right" when it
was discussing Bowers, and that the Court did not use other key terms
such as "strict scrutiny" or "compelling state interest" in the opinion at
all, supports the proposition that it did not intend to create a new
right.155 The language used in the Lawrence opinion stating that the
state interest was
anti-sodomy statute did not further a legitimate
"consistent with the rational basis test."156
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit is not the only court that has ruled
an obscenity statute to be constitutional. In Mississippi, a statute
prohibiting the sale, lease, and distribution of sexual devices was also
found to be constitutional when it was challenged by vendors.157 In
PHE, Inc. v. State,58 the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that there
was no fundamental right to sell or purchase sexual devices.159 The
court did acknowledge that individuals have a right to sexual autonomy
and that the right to privacy "is so personal that its protection does not
require the giving of a reason for its exercise. That one is a person,
Distinguishing this right to
unique and individual, is enough."16
personal or bodily integrity, the Supreme Court of Mississippi still
determined that there is no fundamental right of access to purchase
recognize
sexual devices, comparing it to the Supreme Court's refusal1 to
6
an independent right of access to purchase contraceptives. '
The court stated that if individuals were "sexually dysfunctional" and
were unable to achieve sexual satisfaction without the assistance of a
sexual device, those individuals should seek medical assistance or
treatment from a physician or psychologist. 62 In such instances, the
court concluded, such individuals would be able to purchase a sexual

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

No. 13-810-GMS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106156 (D. Del. Aug. 1, 2014).
Id. at *12.
Id. at *12-13.
Id. at *13.
PHE, Inc. v. State, 877 So. 2d 1244, 1249 (2004).
877 So. 2d 1244 (2004).
Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1248 (quoting In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1040 (Miss. 1985)).
Id.
Id.
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medical provider and therefore not be in violation of
device from1 their
63
the statute.

With states across the country at odds in determining what effect, if
any, Lawrence has on obscenity laws, scholars also continue to contemplate what Lawrence means for morals-based legislation, in particular
legislation concerning sexual privacy.
C. A Scholarly View
Similar to federal and state courts, scholars are divided in determining
the meaning of the majority's ruling in Lawrence and whether it created
a new fundamental right. The Court's decision in Lawrence has been
analogized with its prior decision in Brown v. Board of Education'6
because the interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment for both
matters departed greatly from the original understanding of the
Amendment.16 Although the cases bear similarities in the way in
which the Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, where Brown
recognized a right, Lawrence all but avoided explicitly establishing a new
right.16

The issue with the Lawrence Court's refusal to apply a higher scrutiny
level, it is argued, is that the Court actually found the Texas statute
unconstitutional under rational-basis scrutiny, where courts usually give
deference to a state's decision.6 7 This observation can potentially lead
to problems because it is typically very difficult for a law to be struck
down under rational-basis review because the threshold is so low. The
fact that the Lawrence Court struck down the anti-sodomy statute
simply based upon the fact it was a morals-based piece of legislation
leaves more to be desired. Surely, as has been evidenced by the
Eleventh Circuit and Fifth Circuits rulings, applying such a standard to
privacy can lead to arbitrary and inconsistent
cases implicating
168
results.

Like the Eleventh Circuit, some argue that Lawrence did not create a
new fundamental right to privacy, purportedly proven by the fact that
the Court has been hesitant to create this new right.6 9 There is not
163. Id. at 1249.
164. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
165. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge),104 MICH. L. REV.
431, 437 (2005).

166. Compare Brown, 347 U.S. 483 with Lawrence, 539 U.S. 598.
167. Klarman, supra note 165, at 437.
168. CompareWilliams 1, 378 F.3d 1232 with Reliable Consultants,Inc., 517 F.3d 738.
169. Christen Sproule, Fifth General Issue of Gender and Sexuality Law: The Pursuit
of Happiness and the Right to Sexual Privacy: A Proposalfor a Modified Rational Basis
Review for Due ProcessRights, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 791, 805 (2004).
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a recognized fundamental right to adult, consensual sex, although the
right has been implicated in other related recognized rights.17 °
Because standard rational-basis review is so lenient and can be easily
overcome by states claiming public morality, it has been suggested that
courts apply a "modified rational basis standard" or intermediate
scrutiny level to these matters.'7 ' One author suggests that while it
appears the Lawrence Court used the rational basis test, at the same
time the decision suggests the Court acknowledged that certain sexual
rights deserve a higher scrutiny level. 7 2 It has been argued that the
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" discussion found in
the Lawrence decision was fundamentally unnecessary because the Court
refused to recognize a new fundamental right. 7 3 By employing Romer
v. Evans as its precedent, it is suggested that the Court itself employed
a modified rational-basis scrutiny level in its decision."7
Another argument is that the Lawrence court dodged "the traditional
tiers of scrutiny altogether." 7 ' The Court was vague in establishing
the liberty interest at stake in the matter, and it never addressed
whether it should utilize strict-scrutiny analysis.' 7 ' Accordingly, it is
claimed, the Court generalized the right that was suggested in Lawrence
rather than limited it.'77 Possibly, by generalizing the right suggested,
the Court has cleared the way for more "rights" to be recognized, even
if not explicitly recognized.
Judge Barkett of the Eleventh Circuit dissented to the Williams I
decision, contending that the majority's finding "directly conflict[ed] with
the Supreme Court's" decision in Lawrence. 7 Echoing the opinions
of many, Judge Barkett explained that the Lawrence Court held that
there was indeed a right to sexual privacy, which was included in the
right to privacy.'79 Substantive due process requires, according to
Judge Barkett, that every law address a legitimate governmental
purpose, and accordingly, "any law challenged as violating substantive

170. Id .at 805.
171. Id. at 811.
172. Id. at 810.
173. Id. at 811 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
174. Id. at 812.
175. Pamela S. Karlan, Colloquium: The Boundariesof Liberty After Lawrence v. Texas:
Foreward:Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1450 (2004).
176. Id. The lack of discussion of strict scrutiny is evidenced by the Court's failure to
discuss the strict-scrutiny analysis that came out of Glucksberg, which provides steps to
determining whether a right is fundamental.
177. Id. at 1451.
178. Williams 1,378 F.3d at 1250 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1252-53.
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She argued,
due process right must survive rational-basis review." '
however, that laws that affect rights falling within the rights to privacy
are only constitutionally valid if the government can meet a higher
scrutiny level.' 8 ' In support of her argument that there is a right to
sexual privacy, Judge Barkett noted that through the Supreme Court's
decisions of Roe v. Wade, Griswold v. Connecticut,"s2 Eisenstadt v.
Baird,18 3 and Carey v. Population Services International,"' the right
had already been established."S
It has also been noted that the Court often changes its tune once
public opinion shifts.18 6 As public opinion on particular issues evolves
and cases are brought before the High Court, oftentimes the Court will
take heed of the newer sentiments within the community and, in some
cases, overrule its previous decisions. 8 7 Regardless, even when the
Court follows public sentiment in its decisions, it typically takes a while
for an opinion of the Court to take effect.' 88

180. Id. at 1252.
181. Id. See also Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of IntimateAssociation, 89 YALE L.J.
624, 627 (1980) ("What the freedom does demand is a serious search for justifications by
the state for any significant impairment of the values of intimate association... [a]nd...
it rejects as illegitimate any asserted justification for repression of expressive conduct
based on the risk that a competing moral view will come to be accepted.").
182. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
183. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
184. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
185. Williams I, 378 F.3d at 1252 & n.4 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
186. See generally Klarman, supra note 165, at 450-51. For example, when public
sentiment regarding segregation in schools turned against the southern states, the court
ruled for desegregation in Brown v. Boardof Education. Similarly, when public opinions
shifted in favor of interracial marriages, the Court struck down anti-miscgenation statutes.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. The effects of Lawrence operated effectively the same-the
Court's decision came when the public's opinion about same-sex relationships was
changing.
187. For example, Brown overruled Plessy v.Ferguson. 347 U.S. at 495.
188. See generally Klarman, supra note 165, at 451. After the Supreme Court decision
in Brown, southern states were slow in putting it into effect. The decision took place in
1954, but a majority of southern schools were not successfully integrated until the 1970s.
It has even been argued that the Brown decision "retarded progressive racial reform in the
South." Id. at 453-54. After the Court's decision in Lawrence, a fear resonated within the
religious circles that the decision would definitely lead to gay marriage rights. Id. at 459.
It appears that there is a direct correlation: the Court refuses to strike down laws based
on public morals until the public's opinions on such matters turn against those laws, but
at the same time, such decisions have the tendency to bring out the worst, and even more
resistance, from supporters.
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ANALYSIS OF THE VALIDITY OF THE SANDY SPRINGS STATUTE

A. Does the Sandy Springs OrdinanceFall Within the Scope of the
Right Enunciated in Lawrence? If So, Can the State Meet Its Burden
of a Compelling State Interest?
As previously stated, it has been suggested that rather than attempting to have the right to sexual privacy recognized as a fundamental one,
challenges to obscenity statutes should be subjected to rational basis
review."18 However, it seems more likely that, with Lawrence taken
into consideration, the Supreme Court did acknowledge at least a
smidgen of a right, although not explicitly, to sexual privacy.
[S]tatutes prohibiting the distribution of sexual devices are subject to
the Supreme Court's underdeveloped modified rational basis standard
because they infringe not upon a fundamental right, but upon a quasifundamental right. Infringement upon such a right warrants a higher
degree of review than the traditional rational basis test. Under this
modified standard, courts may require a closer fit between the statute's
means and ends, and may more closely scrutinize the state's purported
interest to ensure that it was the actual motivation of the legislature
and not just a motivation concocted for purposes of litigation. As such,
the statutes should be struck down under this more stringent review
because the states' actual interests are not rationally related to the
challenged statutory prohibitions.1 °
Because the Eleventh Circuit has already used the rational-basis test
to uphold the Alabama obscenity statute, the district court utilized the
same test to conclude the Ordinance is constitutional.19 ' Presenting
the matter before the Eleventh Circuit, to have the Ordinance struck
down as unconstitutional, at bare minimum the Plaintiffs in Flanigan's
will need to prove that in enacting the law, the Sandy Springs government had no legitimate interest in the law or that there was no
reasonable, rational link between the government's interest and the
challenged law. The Plaintiffs' main challenge, however, will be
convincing the court that its previous interpretation of Lawrence was
incorrect.

189. Sproule, supra note 169, at 803.
190. Id.
191. See Williams 1, 378 F.3d 1238 (because the Lawrence Court utilized the rationalbasis test to strike down the Texas sodomy statute, it follows suit that the same test would
be utilized in determining the constitutionality of an obscenity statute.); see also
Flanigan's,2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180429, at *31.
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The council's findings, memorialized in Sandy Springs Municipal Code
§ 26-21,192 provide insight into the city's purposes, intentions, and
goals sought to be achieved in enacting the Ordinance.' 93 Regarding
adult establishments, the council desired to protect the morals and
integrity of the city by enacting provisions such as the Ordinance as well
of establishments deemed to be
as other laws that limit the activity
"sexually explicit businesses.""9
In Ordinance No. 2009-04-24,19'
which amended Section 38-120, the city claims that it has a substantial
governmental interest to protect and maintain the morality of the city
and that the "commercial distribution of obscene material is injurious to
public order and morality and is not protected by the First Amendment."' 9 To justify its actions, the code states that in Chambers v.
Peach County, Georgia,'97 the Georgia Supreme Court "held that local
governments may adopt ordinances designed to combat the undesirable
secondary effects of sexually explicit businesses, and further held that
a governing authority seeking to regulate adult establishments must
have evidence of a relationship between the proposed regulation and the
undesirable secondary effects it seeks to control."198
To support its claim of negative secondary effects, the findings
provision states that the city council received evidence proving the
negative impact adult establishments have had on the community.'99
Such evidence included alcohol abuse, prostitution, diminished property
values, and the law enforcement's failure to enforce laws governing adult
establishments. 0 0 The council believes that the presence of adult
establishments brings undesirable secondary effects, including the
promotion of the sex industry.2"' By enacting the Ordinance, the city

§

192.

SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE

193.

See id.

26-21.

194.

SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 26-21(4).

195. Sandy Springs, Ga. Ordinance No. 2009-04-24.
196. Id. The provision goes on to cite a plethora of First Amendment matters,
including Miller, 413 U.S. 15; Sewell v. Georgia, 238 Ga. 495, 233 S.E.2d 187 (1977); and
Chamblee Visuals, LLC v. City of Chamblee, 270 Ga. 33, 506 S.E.2d 113 (1998).
197. 266 Ga. 318, 467 S.E.2d 519 (1996).
198.

SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE

§ 26-21

(4).

§ 26-21(7).
§ 26-21(7Xa). The council also received testimony
200.
about one adult media outlet containing booths with "glory holes". SANDY SPRINGS, GA.
CODE § 26-21(7Xb).
201. See Sandy Springs, Ga. Ordinance No. 2009-04-24. The provision states that "the
City has a substantial government interest in preventing the negative secondary effects of
establishments which trade in indecent and obscene materials." Id.
199.

SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE
SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE
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sought to promote itself as an attractive place where commercial
businesses can establish themselves in a family-friendly community s 2
The findings provision also states that in Chambers the Georgia
Supreme Court held that a city may also use the experience of other
municipalities and counties in enacting legislation." 3 To support this,
the Council claims to have based its enactment of the law on "the
experiences of other municipalities and counties including" Garden
Grove, California; Gwinnett County, Georgia; Houston, Texas; and New
York, New York.2°" The section cites several cases from the Supreme
justify and support the implicaCourt and other states' courts to help
2 5
tions and purpose of the Ordinance.
The § 26-21 findings provision mostly seems to contemplate the
secondary effects brought into the city limits by strip clubs.20 6 Adult
novelty stores are briefly discussed, but the majority of the issues
presented are a result of adult-oriented bars where alcohol is served. 0 7
In one instance of a "glory hole" discovered in an adult novelty store acts
as a justification to ban all adult novelty stores.20 8 The Council
acknowledges that "adult businesses are ... protected under the free
speech clause of the First Amendment ... " and that it only seeks to
regulate the operation of such establishments.2 9
The provision being argued by the Flanigan Plaintiffs, however, has
no codified findings clause attached to it. 21' The provision can be
found in the city code's "Offenses and Miscellaneous Provisions" chapter,
211
under the section entitled "Offenses Involving Public Morals".
Because the Ordinance outright criminalizes the sale and distribution of
sexual devices, it begs the question: if the city, evidenced by its finding
clause in § 26-21, only sought to regulate adult businesses in their
operating times, why would the city see the need to completely ban the
sale of "obscene material"? Surely, if adult establishments selling nudity
and alcohol can still operate, those same establishments, or others
specifically dedicated to adult novelty material, should be able to the
same.

202.
203.

SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 26-21(1).
SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 26-21(4)45).

204.

SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 26-21(8).

205. SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 26-21.
206. SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 26-21(7).
207. Id.
208.

SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 26-21(7Xb).

209.
210.

SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 26-21(12).
See SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 38-120.

211. Id.
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The only findings attached to § 38-120 are found in Ordinance No.
2009-04-24.12 The ordinance cites a litany of cases regarding the
legislature's ability and power to protect morality and public order.213
However, citing cases and listing generalized statements pulled from
cases does not suffice to show the governmental interest the sale,
distribution, or leasing of sexual devices threatens. If taken in whole
with the findings provision found in § 26-21, only one instance, stated
above, serves as the council's justification for prohibiting the sale of such
objects.
In § 26-22, the chapter's definition section, the council defined an
"adult bookstore" as an establishment that dedicated at least twenty-five
percent of its floor space to the "display, sale, and/or rental of. . . (1)
Books, magazines ... photographs, films ... CDs, DVDs ... (2)
Instruments, devices, novelties, toys . . for use in connection with
specified sexual activities .. . .,21' The same type of store or establishment is contemplated in § 38-120, but that particular provision outright
criminalizes the sale or distribution of sexual devices.2 15 Where § 2621 purports to simply impose licensing and regulations upon adult
establishments, § 38-120 outright bans the sale or distribution of sexual
mention of the possibility of obtaining a license to
.devices, making no 216
sell such materials.
If the city of Sandy Springs intended its obscenity statute to apply
only to those who did not obtain a license to sell such material, its
provision is unduly vague. Reading the provision in isolation, it would
lead one to believe that it serves as a blanket ban on the sale of sexual
devices. However, when one turns to the earlier provision regarding
adult establishments, confusion ensues. Novelty stores are mentioned
in the earlier provision as adult establishments that the city seeks to
regulate, and reading that provision in isolation appears to allow the
sale of such devices as long as the owners of the establishment comply
with the licensing laws set in place. Looked at together, it is difficult to
discern whether the two provisions were intended to work together in
tandem, or separately.
In Article IV of the code, where § 38-120 is contained, there is no
definition section to define who a "person" is-is a "person" any individual
selling so-called obscene material, including individuals working in adult
establishments that sell adult novelties? Or by "person" does the

212. See Sandy Springs, Ga. Ordinance No. 2009-04-24.
213. See id.
214. SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 26-22.
215. SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 38-120(e).
216. See id.
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provision include individuals who do not work in commercial establishments? Additionally, this particular section of the code does not include
a findings provision-the reader has no indication (unless he looks to
§ 26-21) of what the city sought to do with the enactment of the law.
Furthermore, the Ordinance makes no reference whatsoever to § 26-21,
provision, on its own criminalibut rather appears to be a stand-alone
217
zing the sale of "obscene material".
As far as restricting or regulating adult establishments, the city's
finding clause in § 26-21 proposes a legitimate state interest. However,
regarding the actual obscenity statute, the city has failed to establish a
legitimate interest in prohibiting the sale of obscene materials. If § 2621 is supposed to apply to § 38-120 as well, simply justifying the
outright ban on the distribution of sexual devices based upon one
instance of finding a "glory hole" at an establishment does not serve as
a legitimate governmental interest. Even so, if the city simply sought
to regulate the activity of adult establishments, what purpose would
banning the sale of sexual devices serve? In other words, if the city had
a legitimate state interest in regulating the existence of such establishments, but still allows them to exist, what legitimate interest does the
city have in further regulating or completely banning the sale of sexual
devices?
Some commentators argue that bare public morality suffices as a
legitimate state interest in enacting obscenity statutes. 2 8 While in
some cases, as discussed above, this may hold true, it does not prove
true in this instance. Had the city of Sandy Springs expressly identified
a reason for enacting § 38-120, and if it were not in conflict with § 26-21,
such a determination would be warranted. However, there is simply not
enough evidence provided, nor is there a reconciliation between the two
provisions, to come to such a conclusion.
B.

Morals Based Legislation - Does it have a place?

Legislation based on morality creates laws that "are specifically aimed
at curing so-called immoral behavior, that is, acts that violate a social

217. In the their complaint, the Flanigan'sPlaintiffs simply address the council's
failure to present evidence supporting the notion that restricting the marketing of obscene
material would further a legitimate state interest. See Flanigan'sEnters., Inc., 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 180429, at *7.
218. See Nathan R. Curtis, UnravelingLawrence's ConcernsAbout LegislatedMorality:
The Constitutionalityof Laws Criminalizingthe Sale of Obscene Devices, 2010 B.Y.U.L.
REV. 1369, 1380, 1387 (arguing that the sale of sex toys is a public activity rather than a
private one and that the Court has repeatedly upheld the ability of legislatures to "legislate
morals"). The comment goes on to note that sex-toy statutes have a commercial element
to them, one which was not present in Lawrence. Id. at 1390.
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norm or taboo."219 An alarming issue that comes out of morality
legislation is the notion that it seeks to instill "virtue" or morals into
society as a whole.220 In a sense, morals-based legislation goes against
the grain of the Constitution's promotion of freedom. Although it is true
that the implementation of some moral beliefs into laws is necessary,
laws based solely upon morals should be heavily scrutinized. Some
argue that because this country is a democracy, "the best arbiter of
morality is the majority."2 21 However, this approach fails to take into
account that members of the minority may (and probably do) find certain
behaviors repugnant.
Another difficulty that comes into play with morals-based legislation
is how punishment should be issued. Oftentimes, when it comes to the
majority determining what is "right" and "wrong," the punishment tends
to be harsh towards those who do not follow suit. Historically, moralsbased legislation has been enacted against political, religious, gender,
and racial minorities, and persists still. One author claims that "facts
and evidence are always separated from moral viewpoints by subjective
value judgments."222
In his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia expressed concern that the
2
majority's opinion would lead to the end of all morals legislation. "
According to Justice Scalia, the majority's opinion would eventually lead
to the striking down of laws prohibiting prostitution, incest, bigamy, and
However, Justice Scalia's snowball-effect
other unsavory crimes.2 2
theory is not necessarily valid. Justice Scalia interpreted the majority's
adoption of Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Bowers that a state's
view of an act "as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice," to have as a blanket effect over all moralsbased legislation.225 However, the majority's interpretation did not
unilaterally condemn all morals-based legislation, but rather laws that
rather than being morally
damage
have no other basis or proof of 22
6
abhorrent by the local populations.
However, even without recognizing morality as a legitimate state
interest, there are other factors and aspects to these prohibitions that

219. S.I. Strong, Romer v. Evans and the PermissibilityofMorality Legislation,39 ARIZ.
L. REV.1259, 1261 (1997).

220. Id. at 1269-70.

221. Id. at 1271.
222. See Sarah Braasch, Morality HasNo Place In the Law, PATHEOS

(Jan. 14, 2011),

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/dayightatheism/2011/01/mraity-has-no-place-in-the-law/.
223.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

224. Id.
225. Id. (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216).
226. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
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would serve a legitimate state interest. 227 For example, when it comes
to incest, the chances of such relations resulting in the birth of
handicapped children increase greatly due to the close sharing of
genetics. 2" Prostitution, in turn, has the potential to pose negative
effects upon local areas.2 9 In other words, most "morals-based" laws
have purposes other than just being morally opposed by the population.
Some of the laws mentioned in Justice Scalia's dissent are in place
because they have the potential to have negative impacts on the
population as whole. Sodomy laws prohibiting sexual behavior among
same-sex couples and obscenity laws prohibiting the purchase and sale
of sexual devices do not have an impact upon the general population-the
activities prohibited by such laws are private in nature.
Interestingly enough, one of the morals-based laws that Justice Scalia
feared would be deemed unconstitutional were obscenity laws, whose
constitutionality, as this Comment discusses, is being questioned
throughout the county.230 Imposing the majority's morals upon the
whole population suggests superiority and favoritism toward a particular
group that should not be permitted. According to the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution, all are to be treated equal. Laws
prohibiting acts that are considered immoral by a portion of the
population alone should not exist.

227. See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. Some argue that any sexual relationship may lead to having a child with
disabilities and that such possibilities should not be the sole purpose for banning
incestuous relationships. See Tauriq Moosa, Is Incest Wrong?, BIG THINK, (n.d.),
http://bigthink.com/think-tank/is-incest-wrong. In October 2014, a New York Court of
Appeals, in a unanimous ruling, legalized a certain degree of incest - that between a
woman and her mother's half-brother. Nguyen v. Holder, 21 N.E.2d 1023, 1024 (N.Y.
2014). The couple's attorney found that relatives with the same relationship as the
plaintiffs share about one-eighth of the same DNA, similar to the same amount cousins
share with one another. Julia Marsh, NY State Blesses 'Incest' MarriageBetween Uncle,
Niece, N.Y. POST (Oct. 29, 2014), http'//nypost.com/2014/10/29/new-york-state-blesses-incestmarriage-between-uncle-niece/. The three incestuous relationships prohibited by the state
were: 1. An ancestor or descendent; 2. A brother and sister of half or whole blood; and 3.
An uncle and niece and an aunt and nephew. Nguyen, 21 N.E.3d at 1025.
229. It has also been argued that legalizing prostitution will open the floodgates to sex
trafficking, child prostitution, and more. See Janice G. Raymnond, 10 Reasons for Not
Legalizing Prostitution,CoalitionAgainst Trafficking in Women International,COALITION
AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, Mar. 25, 2003, www.catwinternational.org/contentlimages/article262/attachment.pdf. On the other hand, others argue that the legalization of
prostitution will keep prostitutes out of dangerous situations and drop STD rates. See Jim
Norton, In Defense of Johns, TIME.COM (Aug. 6, 2014), http://time.com/3087616/defensejohns-legalize-prostitution/.
230. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The ramifications of violating a morals-based law are typically harsh.
Punishments so harsh for criminalized acts that have no tangible
negative effect on the community, such as in Sandy Springs, are a
drastic measure. When one violates a morals-based law, a stigma is
essentially placed over his or her head and by showing up in criminal
records or taking away a piece of supposed violator's dignity. The Texas
statute involved in Lawrence imposed a class C misdemeanor-which
although a minor offense in the state, would still remain on purported
violator's records."' If such charges remained on offenders' records,
the offenders would be subjected to registration laws of at least four
states if he or she were to be subjected to their jurisdiction.232 If an
individual was found guilty of violating the statute at issue in Williams
I, he or she could be found guilty of a misdemeanor and assessed a fine
not exceeding $10,000.00 upon conviction. 233 Additionally, violators
also face the possibility of being imprisoned in the county jail or
The
sentenced to hard labor for a period not exceeding one year.'
Texas statute struck down by the Fifth Circuit in Reliable had the
potential to place violator in jail up to two years.235
Although the Ordinance is not as harsh as the statute in Williams,236 the gravity of the punishment imposed upon violators causes
one to pause. Although the statute applies primarily to vendors of
sexual devices, it imposes restrictions on purchasers as well, who are
unable to purchase the products they want locally. The Ordinance very
closely resembles the statute that was at issue in Williams I. These
statutes impose harsh punishments for activities that individuals
their main
typically engage in in the privacy of their own homes, and
237
purpose in existing is to promote the majority's morality.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The problem with the Ordinance is that it is vague and fails to target
other issues related to the sale of sexual devices. If the City wants to
prohibit the sale of such devices, it should also seek to prohibit the

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 575.
Id.
ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2.
Id.
Reliable Consultants,Inc. 517 F.3d at 741; TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.35(a).

236.

See SANDY SPRINGS, GA. CODE § 1-10.

237. Interestingly enough, however, save for the Supreme Court's opinion in Lawrence,
the punishments contemplated by these statutes did not contribute to their respective
courts' decisions (at least explicitly). See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575; see generally Williams
1, 378 F.3d 1232.
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advertisement of such devices, because the two are closely related. The
fact that the city has failed to do so, however, raises concern and
supports the inference that the city strategically set up the statute to
withstand a constitutional challenge, because surely if it prohibited the
advertisement of such products, its chances of withstanding such
challenges would not be as strong.
A prohibition on the sale of sexual devices essentially operates as a
prohibition on the use of such devices, because it limits an individual's
access to such devices. Obscenity statutes such as the one that exists in
Sandy Springs-although it facially does not prohibit the use or
possession of sexual devices-pervade and weave themselves into the
private lives of citizens residing both inside and outside of the city
limits-what individuals choose to do in their private lives is essentially
interfered with by the local government.
Because the city has failed to provide concrete evidence pertaining to
the secondary effects that the distribution of sexual devices pose on the
community, it has failed to meet its burden of proof. Mere claims of
secondary effects should not satisfy the legitimate governmental-interest
test in these cases. Even more so, bare claims of protecting the public
morality, without more, should not survive as sufficient justification.
Hopefully the Eleventh Circuit will take advantage of the opportunity
presented before it to either strike down the Ordinance, as well as others
like it, or articulate a specific body of law, not based upon morality, to
justify allowing such statutes to exist.
TOMIYA LEWIS

